Poland's security policy in an unstable world by Nowak, Jerzy M.
 33 Nação e Defesa
P o l a n d ’ s  S e c u r i t y  P o l i c y
i n  a n  U n s t a b l e  Wo r l d *
Jerzy M. Nowak**
President of the Polish Euro-Atlantic Association
A Política de Segurança da Polónia num Mundo 
Instável
Comunicação proferida pelo Embaixador Jerzy M. 
Nowak, no IDN no dia 9 de Dezembro de 2009, 
no âmbito do ciclo de conferências intitulado 
Visões Globais para a Defesa.
Lecture delivered by the Ambassador Jerzy M. Nowak 
at the Portuguese National Defence Institute on the 
9th December 2009. The lecture was delivered in the 
context of a cycle of seminars on the subject Global 
Visions for Defence.
Primavera 2010
N.º 125 – 4.ª Série
pp. 33-48
* This text expresses purely personal views of the author and may not be regarded as stating position of the Polish 
Government.
** Ambassador Jerzy M. Nowak was head of the Policy Planning and Security Departments in the Polish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. He represented his country as ambassador to OCSCE, IAIE, UNIDO, Spain, Andorra and then NATO (2002-2007); 
in 2009 – heading security policy review in the MFA. He is President of the Polish Euro-Atlantic Association, teaches 
European security and diplomacy in the University of Torun and Diplomatic Academy in Warsaw; writes and publishes 
on these subjects.
 35 Nação e Defesa
Introductory remarks
At the outset let me express my sincere thanks and gratitude for this invitation, 
allowing me to present before this distinguished audience a Polish vision of the 
security and defense policy. You have invited to Lisbon a representative of a 
Central European country which constitutes the, Eastern wing of Europe, while 
Portugal the Western one, both being integral part of the Euro-Atlantic area. This 
is to me an example of your universal approach to the problems of security and 
interdependence in our continent.
I have been invited to give this lecture at a crucial moment of a need to 
redefi ne some assumptions of the Polish security policy, after 20 years of regaining 
sovereignty, in view of instability, vagueness and unpredictability prevailing in the 
present international environment.
Brief historical reminder
After the peaceful liberation from the Soviet domination in 1989, Poland availed 
itself of an opportunity to return to the Western World, an objective which was 
not guaranteed at that time. It was not only the question of not achieving proper 
standards. This could have been done within a relatively short period of time. 
But, as an aftermath of the “autumn of the Nations”, at the end of the Cold War, 
20 years ago, the Western Powers concentrated mainly on preventing a violent 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and then the Russian Federation. Central Europe 
was then their secondary interest.
For a few years after the fall of the Soviet Empire, Central Europeans were given 
to understand that NATO was not a realistic option, and European Union was a 
long distance dream. Central Europeans, or “new democracies” as they were called, 
were encouraged to democratize the Warsaw Pact and their relations with the Soviet 
Union, rather than seek an access to the Western Alliance. Wide-spread expectations 
of a new Marshall Plan for Central Europe did not materialized. Washington gave 
to understand that the United States would protect new democracies, but economic 
recovery and integration with Europe was left to the European Union. As a result, 
Poland, like other States of the region, had to rely mainly on their own potential 
ruined by more than half century of devastating Second World War, German 
occupation and then the oppressive communist dictatorship.
I do not intend to describe here the history of the modifi cation of this Western 
attitude (modifi ed after aborted coup of Gennadi Yanayev in August 1991), which 
Poland’s Security Policy in an Unstable World
Nação e Defesa 36
Jerzy M. Nowak
was a fascinating story in itself, because it does not belong to our to-day’s subject. So, 
let us just remind that this process ended with the accession of the so called “Madrid 
Troika” (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) to the North Atlantic Alliance in 
1999 and to the European Union in 2004. It meant inter alia that we found ourselves 
together with Portugal in the same alliance and integration organism. Historic justice 
to the Central Europe has been done, Yalta system came to an end, Soviet troops 
were withdrawn, Central Europeans have recovered their sovereignty.
Six pillars of the Polish security
It was then that six basic pillars of the Polish security and defense policy, apart 
from economic recovery and effectively working democracy, have begun to be 
gradually formed, based on the following hierarchy:
1. Building of modern national defense potential, based on operability with 
NATO, relatively modest, but the largest in Central European region, reduced 
according to the limitations of the CFE Treaty to presently ca. 99.000 troops 
(during the Cold War – 450 000), 1000 tanks, 210 combat helicopters; 222 
combat aircraft (including F-16), around 80 vessels; expeditionary capabilities 
have been increased; as late as in 2009 conscript system was abandoned and 
professional army has been introduced;
2. Active membership in NATO; when acceding to NATO, Poland followed, 
by large, a similar mental approach like the one formulated by Aldo Moro 
in 1950’s: “it was a choice of certain type of civilization”; our participation in 
this most successful collective defense alliance in history means in particular: 
interest in the proper functioning of art.5 of the Washington Treaty as a basic 
security guarantee, effective collective territorial defense (Warsaw believes 
that there is a need to refocus NATO also on threats near home) and in 
parallel – meaningful participation in the Alliance’s stabilizing and other 
missions (Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan – 1600 troops, “Active Endeavour” in 
the Mediterranean – together with Portugal); creating trilateral battle group 
with Ukrainians and Lithuanians; ensuring NATO enlargement to the East 
(Ukraine in particular); interest in double function of the NATO Response 
Force (NRF) – external missions and territorial defense in the meaning of art. 
5, i.e rejection of a concept of “NATO as “a gendarme of the world”;
3. Developing “strategic relations’ with the United States, whose military 
presence in Europe has been treated in Warsaw as an additional, strategic 
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security guarantor; this relation required some sacrifi ces from our part, such 
as supporting the US in Iraq (again together with Portugal), buying F-16 
instead of Mirage aircraft and risking problems in relations with France, 
having understanding towards American superpower politics, often against 
domestic public opinion etc.;
4. Integration within the European Union, in particular the development of the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP): strengthening of the “Battle 
Groups”, stabilizing missions, defense industry cooperation; interest in gradual 
development of the territorial defense concept within the European dimension; 
it is not a surprise that the Polish Presidency in the European Union in 2011 
will concentrate on giving breath of new life to ESDP, consolidating EU 
defense potential, including European Defense Agency, stabilizing missions 
etc.;
5. Building stable, good and close relations with the direct neighbors; instead 
of three neighbours as during the Cold War (USSR, GDR and Czechoslovakia), 
Poland is bordering now seven new States: four of them belonging to NATO, 
three of them belonging to the Community of Independent States and to 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization, including Russia, having an 
enclave in the Kaliningrad district. Relations with Russia and Belarus require 
different attention and we will return to them later; however, three issues 
should be emphasized at this point: fi rst, in our view there will be no safe 
Poland without independent Ukraine and Belarus; second, that the role of 
Germany on Poland’s security is of paramount importance, and third, there 
are two particularly important instruments for the Polish regional activity: 
“Weimar Triangle” (France, Germany and Poland) and “Visegrad Group” 
(Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, collaborating closely 
with Slovenia, Romania and Ukraine) and EU “Eastern Partnership”;
6. Participation in developing a cooperative system of security and arms 
control in Europe, based on the concepts of indivisibility of security as well 
as an inclusion of all partners, as a supplementary instrument of the overall 
security, on the basis of the OSCE, CFE regime, Confi dence and Security 
Building Measures (CSBM’s) regime, Open Skies regime, and various UN 
based disarmament projects, as well as some informal initiatives like “The 
Cracow Non-Proliferation Initiative”.
NATO and EU membership, creating solid fundaments for our security policy, 
were not, however, a goal in itself or a panacea for all the security problems Poland 
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and other Central Europeans were faced with. They created only advantageous and 
secure external conditions for home development, based on respect for the principles 
of democracy, market economy and human rights, as well as for the strengthening 
of the international position of the country. However, such a condition has not been 
given forever and it is up to us to contribute effectively to common, indivisible 
and lasting security.
Change and new threats – global dimension, Polish perspective
Our view of the world, as in the case of other nations, Portugal I guess included, 
depends to a large extend on the persistence of particular historical experience, 
related with wars and other dramatic historical memories. Different geographic 
locations, psychologies, new challenges and threats as well as burdens of history, 
cannot be disregarded when dealing with international relations. It applies also to 
Poland and they shape the evolution of the Polish security and defense policy.
Some of them are common to the Polish and the Portuguese perspective and 
are related to stronger neighbors (although in case of Portugal it should be written 
in singular). Let me present a Polish perspective on this matter and refer briefl y to 
our challenges, both real and perceived ones.
The situation before 1989 was clear: bipolar system ensured a high level of 
stability, but for Poland it meant stabilization of a satellite status. The last 20 years of
unipolar system meant for us a security protection by the United States and NATO. The 
accelerating modifi cation of this system and of the geopolitical situation has become
more and more visible. The line between the internal and the external politics is 
becoming more and more blurred. On the one hand we have a growing interdependence 
with other States and on the other hand, globalization has great implications.
We are facing even more instability and unpredictability than before, due to 
changes in balance of strategic power. Economic strength is shifting to Asia, China 
in particular, and other emerging powers, including Brazil. The United States 
continues to be the most powerful country in the world but its unquestioned 
dominance is gone. Russia’s quest for recreation of an era of great power primacy 
is worrying in particular its closest neighbors, but it may have larger negative 
strategic consequences. The position of the West has been weakened due to internal 
divergences. There is a decrease in solidarity because of the lack of a clear enemy. 
As a result, a phenomenon of renationalisation of security policy has reappeared. 
The European Union has gained a stronger economic position, but is unable to 
convert it into infl uential military factor as well.
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Radical Islam (Al Qaida) and the relative power of nonState actors (Hamas) 
contributed to the destabilization phenomena and lead to the increase of frequency 
of limited wars, like in Afghanistan.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles enhances these 
concerns. None of us, including Poland and Portugal, is free of the danger of 
interdependent instability. Global climate warming is a problem for all, although 
we should treat it more as a chance than a threat, although in Polish conditions, it 
is a complicated matter due to the role of coal in our energy supplies.
This is a typical situation in fl ux, a kind of interregnum, in which old rules of the 
game are not respected any more, but new ones have not yet been worked out and 
approved. Previous bipolar and later unipolar systems have ceased to exist, but a 
new system has not yet emerged, once it is still under construction. The sovereignty 
concept has been questioned and dispersed among differentiated decision centers. 
Local and regional threats gain global dimension. For a medium sized country, 
located in the heart of continental Europe, in between two big powers – Russia 
and Germany – such a chaotic and transitional situation is both a concern and a 
challenge. The Polish existential question is: how to work out a new order and how 
to introduce it effectively?
European dimension – Polish specifi city
Peace and security in Europe, or – if you wish – loose European security 
architecture, has been guaranteed in the last 20 years by a specifi c balance of forces 
among great powers, NATO’s presence, common rules of the game embodied 
primarily in the Helsinki Final and OSCE agreements, a number of following six 
mutually interrelated elements, constituting an interesting confi guration:
a. American presence sensu largo in Europe, including military (NATO), economic 
and cultural fi elds,
b. Enlarged NATO and its ever developed partnership concept, ensuring inter 
alia strong trans-Atlantic link,
c. European Union, its ESDP and neighborhood policy; recently also – “Eastern 
Partnership”,
d. Institutionalized NATO and EU cooperation with Russian Federation and 
Ukraine; it is worth to recall that Russia is demanding in the Medvedev’s 
proposal that post-Soviet area institutions dominated by it, like CIS and 
CSTO, are fully recognized as European partners equal to NATO and EU,
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e. OSCE, its CFE and CSBMs regimes, including establishment of a “Corfu 
Initiative”, to discuss the Medvedev’s initiative,
f. And last but not least, supplementary elements, like Council of Europe, 
dealing with enlarged human rights aspects of this confi guration, as well 
as some sub-regional organisms, like Visegrad Group, Central European 
Initiative, Weimar Triangle, Mediterranean Dimension etc.
Each of these elements has its strengths and weaknesses, but so far this system 
has worked relatively well, though without giving equal protection to all members 
of the Euro-Atlantic area. I have in mind in particular Ukraine, Moldova and 
Caucasus States.
Polish specifi city in this delicate confi guration consists of striving to strengthen all 
these elements towards establishment of an enhanced order which may be called a 
cooperative security, within which NATO ensures credible collective defense. In the 
Polish thinking (main theoretician: professor Adam Daniel Rotfeld, now a member 
of the NATO “Wise Men Group” on the NATO Strategic Concept), the basis of such 
a system should be a triad: security (including soft and hard), economic and social 
development and human security. One of the implications in creating such an order 
is an imperative to strengthen both NATO and EU, their gradual mutual institutional 
bonding, with the aim of creating, in the future, a Trans-Atlantic community of 
security and defense. In other words, more integration and strengthening of the 
West, more openness to the outside world, more multilateralism, more effective 
international organizations. The latest should base their activity on four basic 
principles: solidarity (common confrontation of challenges), subsidiarity (mutual 
assistance in actions), compatibility (cooperation to achieve common goals), 
harmonization of actions.
Recently, however, there are signs that this sensitive Euro-Atlantic confi guration 
may be at stake and deteriorate. I believe that there are three main reasons for that: 
a decreased US interest in Europe (including in its central region), new Russian 
assertiveness, and psychological factors. The last one results from strategic changes 
in relations among powers and from a search of many States for a new place in 
an unstable world. Among destabilizing factors there is an inclination of the great 
powers to be wrapped up in zero-sum games, return to geopolitical thinking, often 
accompanied by emotions and careless rhetoric.
There are also new real areas of confl icts: “frozen confl icts”, Arctic Sea – a quest 
for national resources and transit routes (less known problem in Portugal), access to 
oil and gas and their transfers, lack of common human rights standards in Russia, 
arms control and missile defense problems etc.
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There are three specifi c problems related to the Polish security that I would 
like to treat separately.
The Russian case
Russia is the main foreign policy issue that preoccupies the European Union, 
both as a challenge and as an opportunity. From the Polish perspective, shared by 
many in Europe, the “Russian question” may be described as follows: can Russia 
become an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic community? Due to Polish historical 
experiences, the answer is not an easy one. For centuries Poles lived between 
Germany and Russia which tried to dominate Poland. No surprise that there is an 
inherent, instinctive fear of being encircled by these two powers.
However, the new reality should not be squeezed into past stereotypes. To-day’s 
Germany is our ally in NATO and partner in EU. On the other side, Russia is no 
longer the Soviet Union, it is not a military threat to Central Europe. Problems 
between the Russian Federation and the West are not a new stage of the Cold 
War. Russia needs Europe and the West needs Russia as strategic partners. Russia 
desperately needs modernization and is unable to perform it with her own potential. 
This reality is imposed on everybody, including Russia, and the need for a new 
thinking related to the realistic assumption that security should be based on the 
well controlled interdependence and not on seeking for an enemy, on an increased 
confi dence and not applying old stereotypes. Concept of securtiy indivisibility cannot 
be used as a vehicle to paralyze NATO and EU and dominate neighbors.
But this is only part of the problem. At present, there are, in fact, two Russias: 
one nostalgic of its imperial past and other open to the world, in particular to 
Europe. They compete with each other. Some elements of the present Russian's 
policy are based on the imperial nostalgia and generate tensions in particular in its 
immediate vicinity. After some failures in democratic reforms, Russia has decided 
not to integrate with the West, to adhere to a concept of “a sovereign democracy” 
and to return to the outdated concepts of “correlation of power” and “concert of 
powers” in building a multipolar world order. Domination of the neighborhood is 
treated as an additional tool of national security. The Russian political elite believes 
that a new security order should be negotiated by leading powers only, on the 
basis of their interests, rather than on the basis of equality of partners and on the 
common values embodied in the Helsinki Final Act. It seems that Russian governing 
elites are not able to reconcile themselves with the idea that the era of great power 
primacy and privileged spheres of infl uence is over. They still believe that it would 
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be possible to push Poland, and other Central European States to second class 
category of NATO members and to some kind of dependence on Russian empire. 
Russian intervention in Georgia in August 2008 was an example of this anachronistic 
policy and constituted an infringement of principles of inviolability of frontiers and 
of sovereignty (which occurred for the fi rst time after the end of Cold War).
Poland is concerned by these aspects of the new Moscow's policy, in particular 
its efforts to limit the inherent rights of sovereignty of the Central European States, 
but is not afraid of a massive, classic aggression. On the contrary, Poland is serious 
about reaching out to Russia and deeply interested in formulating a common 
political strategy of NATO and EU on this strategic subject. Joint Polish-German 
leadership within the EU on this crucial matter may give additional legitimacy to 
this issue.
Poland tries seriously to reach out to Russia also by contributing bilaterally to 
this process, forming a “Joint Group for diffi cult matters” and gradually removing 
points of contention (in particular the sensitive psychological issue of the murder 
of 22.000 Polish POW offi cers in the Katyn forests under Stalin's order in 1940). 
There is a lot of common economic, cultural and other interest between the two 
countries. One has to admit, though, that a real point of national difference between 
Warsaw and Moscow is a view on the future of Ukraine: Poland is in favor of an 
independent Ukraine, integrated in the Western institutions, closely collaborating 
with the Russian Federation, while Russia sees Ukraine as an integral, autonomous 
part of a larger Russian empire.
In brief; there is strong believe in Warsaw that positive signals sent recently 
by West to Russia (Obama’s “reset” policy, NATO SG Rasmussen’s proposals, 
“Corfu” dialogue in the OCSE on the Medvedev’s proposal, Polish bilateral efforts 
etc.) require proper reciprocity from the Russian side, instead of the organization 
of huge military exercises on the Polish and Baltic States borders (with a scenario 
including the use of nuclear weapons against Poland) or the continuing anti-NATO 
Cold War type propaganda.
The American case
It seems that the United States is gradually reconciling itself with the fact that 
the world is moving towards a more multi-polar order. The new Administration 
is shifting its focus to the Pacifi c and China, and, at the same time, it is decreasing 
the attention given to Europe so far, it has became a relatively peaceful area. Russia 
became an object of American increased interest mainly regarding policy of Teheran, 
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the engagement in Afghanistan and the prevention to proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction..
This is rather understandable and natural process. Washington probably came 
to the conclusion that Poland and other countries of the region should be providers 
of security rather than importers. However, these policy modifi cations have caused 
some alarm in Central Europe, in particular after the unexpected and abrupt change 
of the missile systems proposals (style also counts: Poland was informed of the 
change ironically exactly on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion in 1939).
What is the reason of such a concern in Poland and other countries of the Central 
European region? To a large extend it is the question of perceptions rather than 
reality. Some people in Central Europe think that a new policy towards Russia may 
leave us alone with Russia in its quest to recover its spheres of infl uence. Others 
believe that putting Central Europe on the lower place on the Washington’s list of 
priorities means leaving possible problems of Russia’s relations with this region 
to the European Union, which, in practice, means to Germany, which in turn is 
now strongly engaged in an economic and investment offensive directed to Russia, 
Siberia in particular. Still some others are concerned with a possibility of creating 
a kind of “security vacuum” in Central Europe, which easily may be fi lled in by 
the Russian Federation or a Russian – German “condominium”.
Even if these are only perceptions and speculations, far from realities, they 
should not be completely discarded or neglected because they may produce 
political consequences. One of them is already evident: American popularity has 
decreased in Poland and other countries of the region to a level comparable with 
other Western European States (a well known manifestation of it was a letter to 
President Obama issued in August 2009, signed by a number of Central European 
statesmen and intellectuals appealing to the new American Administration “not 
to abandon this region”). It should be added at this juncture, that in spite of these 
new Polish perceptions towards the United States, the US continues to be seen as 
“ an indispensable power in Europe and the world”.
Another implication, is getting rid of long lasting Polish illusions on America, for 
example that Poland and US share the same objectives vis-a vis Russia. Therefore, it 
would not be surprising if more healthy realism takes ground in Poland regarding 
the “strategic relations” with the United States; while preserving and increasing 
American crucial commitments in supporting Polish defense arrangements, in 
particular regarding antimissile and air defense. At the same time European Union 
links may be gaining in relative importance.
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The Energy case
Energy dependence as security challenge in Central Europe, in the Polish 
context, also merits a brief separate treatment. The use of energy supplies and 
its transportation by Russia as political weapon is well known. But this problem 
became much more complicated once a decision has been taken to construct the 
ambitious Nord Stream gas pipe line from Russia to Germany through the Baltic sea, 
conspicuously avoiding Poland and Baltic States, in spite of the fact that building 
it on land in Central Europe would be three times cheaper. A question arises: what 
is behind such a decision?
Russia’s intension is clear: Nord Stream route is to by-pass an area Moscow 
considers to be part of its sphere of “privileged interests” or zone of infl uence. 
Even more – Russia does not trust Ukraine and the new EU members, Poland 
in particular, as transit countries, and is ready to undertake appropriate costs to 
by-pass them, instead of seeking a negotiated common modus vivendi in this fi eld. 
In other words, it is also an effort to isolate Central Europe from the Western part 
of the continent.
There is no need to hide that the role of former German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder and Germany itself in this project has been painful to Poland, having 
in mind close the allied relation of Warsaw and Berlin. The interests of German 
industry and fi nancial centers prevailed to such an extend that Germany lobbied 
successfully for the EU endorsement of the project even though pipeline consortium 
is controlled by Russian Gazprom and no single company from Central Europe is 
involved in it. To say it more openly: German position has made more diffi cult the 
efforts carried out by Poland and other countries of the region to reduce Europe’s 
energy dependence on Russian gas and oil and its transportation around Central 
Europe.
It is not my intention to overstate this case, but Polish dilemma is difficult. 
On the one side we have to limit the damage caused by Russian energy policy
and decrease our dependence of Russian gas and oil. In Poland fears reappeared 
that Germany is putting her own interests before Europe’s. On the other side, it 
would be unrealistic to expect Chancellor Angela Merkel to change position on 
the Nord Stream at a so late stage. After all, energy links with Russia should be 
within the normal interdependence model of relations. Our expectation is that, 
at this stage, our following interests are taken into account both by Berlin and 
Brussels:
– To lay the pipe deep enough in the Baltic bottom to allow transportation of 
heavy vessels carrying liquid gas to the Polish LNG ports near Szczecin;
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– to support the EU “strategic priority”, i.e. to develop a Southern Corridor, 
which includes Nabucco pipeline project;
– to send a diplomatic message to Moscow that the principle of solidarity on 
energy still works in the EU and Russian policy “divide et impera” will not 
work.
Poland is not limiting her efforts to arrangements with Russia. A key word for
this policy is “diversifi cation”, looking for gas and oil links also with North Africa
and Gulf States, and last but not least – searching for alternative sources of 
energy.
To conclude this subject: it is necessary to remind that access to energy resources, 
being fossil, water or others is more and more linked to the security policy of the 
European Union. Polish interest is to bring about a situation in which a European 
energy network, with Russian participation, is created on a safe and credible basis. 
Here, the Polish close cooperation with Germany in this fi eld is again crucial in 
building a common European energy policy on Russia.
Security policy priorities and perspectives
Stereotypes apart, Polish security policy is concentrated much more on current 
and future security threats and challenges than on the past memories. An unstable 
security environment forces to revise the security strategy, to get rid of illusions, 
to strengthen the international position of the State and to reply to the question: 
what will be the place of Poland in the future security system on the regional and 
global level?
In case of a medium sized country, located at the heart of Europe, there is no 
reply based on the going alone principle. Therefore, the unity of the West and 
Trans-Atlantic security community is of key signifi cance to Poland. It is clearly in 
the well understood Polish interest to build a strong Europe and prevent its strategic 
marginalization in the construction of a multipolar model of the world.
It is not by chance that a thorough review of the Polish security policy has 
just been under consideration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is based on 
the evolving NATO Strategic Concept, EU European Security Strategy and Polish 
national needs.
So, what are the basic priorities of this policy in facing new threats and challenges? 
I would spell out fi ve of them which I consider to be of particular importance:
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The fi rst is strengthening NATO collective defense guarantees resulting of art. 
5 of the Washington Treaty, as a kind of a security policy in an unstable world. 
This includes a return to credible contingency plans in case of a real threat, 
keeping alive credible deterrence arrangements (taking into account nuclear 
weapons and missile systems), improving the automaticity of decisions in an 
hypothetical case of application of art. 5.
The second is using all possibilities of the Lisbon Treaty regarding ESDP to 
increase security and defense integration, strengthen EU’s global stabilizing and 
security building functions, in particular those complementary to NATO, and 
the development of energy solidarity. These questions will be on top of Poland’s 
priorities during its EU Presidency in the second half of 2011. It is in the interest 
of the whole of Europe, our region in particular, to promote strategic partnership 
of the EU with the United States as guarantors of global stability and security. 
In general terms, our expectation is that EU starts putting Eastern Europe back 
on the diplomatic map, using inter alia effectively “Eastern Partnership” (an idea 
put forward by Sweden and Poland) for this purpose. Polish-German leadership 
in formulating a Russian-EU policy is of particular importance.
The third is pragmatic development of security and defense bilateral ties 
with the United States, as the most powerful NATO ally, in particular in their 
support of the Polish defense potential (as promised by the US Government 
in joint Declaration in August last year, in Warsaw), within a framework 
of general NATO policy. Washington is expected to work out a realistic 
program of security engagement in Central Europe. As far as proposal of the 
installation of American missile defense systems (SM-3) is concerned, Polish 
primary interest will be the integration of this system on NATO’s defense 
arrangements in this field.
The fourth is to work out an institutional cooperation and effective link 
between NATO and the EU and seek a new defi nition of the tasks of these 
two major Western world institutions in the new security environment on 
combating terrorism, humanitarian interventions in failed States, preventing 
pirate attacks and preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as 
well as responding to possible cyber-attacks. A particularly urgent task is to 
work out a joint strategy regarding access to energy resources. Prevention of the 
re-nationalization of security policies of major European and North-American 
States and the return to “concert of powers”, “directorates”, or other forms of 
imposing the will of the big powers onto medium-sized and small States, also 
belongs to the important tasks of this group of priorities.
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The fi fth is to make all the possible efforts to enhance NATO and the EU as a 
common and credible “two-track” policy towards Russia (initiate efforts to bring 
Russia closer to the West and respond positively to constructive offers, react 
adequately to aggressive behavior). Western policy towards Russia should be 
an integral part of a larger dimension embracing “open door” policy to Ukraine, 
Georgia and all other democratic States of the continent interested to join NATO 
and the EU, of course after meeting necessary standards of membership. It is also 
important for the European security to have Turkey within the EU integration 
framework.
Final remarks
These priorities do not exhaust the list of other important tasks of the Polish 
security policy. Their common denominator is strengthening the existing security 
arrangements and institutions, without creating new ones and establishing any 
superficial new security “architecture”. To us, hard security challenges should still 
be on the international agenda as an insurance for unforeseen circumstances.
What is interesting to take note in the list of the Polish security policy is a certain 
modifi cation of the United States position of importance. It continues to be high, it 
is indispensable, but America is not treated as an ultimate protector and the only 
guarantor of our independence and security. At the same time the European Union 
model of security has been located higher than before.
The revision of our security paradigms also confirms that Russia is not 
treated as a threat but rather as a challenge and opportunity. There are hopes for 
gradual integration of Russia within the Western world and for its constructive 
involvement in the security of Europe. Polish first hand reaction to Medvedev’s 
proposal is to ask ourselves, Russians, and other partners whether Moscow’s ideas 
mean security enhancement. If they do, they will be met with a positive response. 
But creating new institutions just for “psychotherapy” is not a rational solution 
in seeking Russia’s dignified place on the continent. As I have already said, by 
building a new Polish-German alliance, it could match what the Franco-German 
rapprochement did for Europe after 1945, also in the context of the so called 
Russian question.
Finally, let me describe in brief Polish security position: Poland is a regional 
power, an important European player and a country of some limited global interests 
as well, the latest implemented mainly through NATO and EU. Its ambition is to 
protect itself in a credible way, to be an integral element of regional correlation of 
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forces in a constructive meaning of this notion, and to contribute to working out 
a new set of rules for the game and a new global security order, where all States, 
small and large alike, may have their dignifi ed and secure place (“multilateralising 
multipolarity”, to use the expression of Alvaro de Vasconcelos). Here, no doubt, 
Polish and Portuguese interests coincide.
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